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ABSTRACT
Even though the idea of partitioning provenance graphs for access control was previously proposed,
employing segments of the provenance DAG for fine-grained access control to provenance data
has not been thoroughly explored. Hence, we take segments of a provenance graph, based on the
extended OPM, and defined use a variant of regular expressions(based on Xpath query language) to
determine which set of nodes can be accessed,and utilize these methods in our fine-gained access
control language. It can not only return partial graphs to answer access requests but also introduce
segments as restrictions in order to screen targeted data.
Keywords fine-grained provenance graphs. · extended OPM. · partitioning.
1 Introduction
Data provenance logs historical operations performed on documents. Provenance can be expressed as a directed
acyclic graph (DAG), illustrating how a data artifact is processed by an execution. In such a DAG of provenance under
the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [5], nodes present three main entities including Artifact, Agent and Process and
edges represent connections to the main entities. Provenance Access Control is considered a crucial research topic
for big data security. Because users can request and be granted access to files and sources separately,the sensitivity of
files and their provenance can be different. In some situations, provenance itself may consist of sensitive information
which might require more protection than its attached document. For instance, although a programming project can
be published to the public, its authors and executed operations should be kept as a secret, to prevent leaking the
techniques. Therefore, access control to the provenance data itself is required, so that it not only allows eligible users
to access the provenance data, but also protects it from unauthorized access. Privacy and security of provenance are
perceived as the main bottleneck to broad applications of provenance [27] [28] [29].
Privacy helps individuals maintain their autonomy and individuality, and security is the protection from theft and
damage to provenance, as well as from disruption or misdirection of provenance. Hence, lacking protection for
privacy and security can not convince users to trust the application of provenance.
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Although there has been great progress in provenance access control, there still exist some difficulties. Existing tradi-
tional access control techniques including role-based access control [25], attribute-based access control [26] cannot be
applied to provenance access control straightforwardly, because of provenance is a type of meta-data with a specific
data structure. Due to the diversity and particularity of provenance data structure, traditional access control technology
is not suitable for provenance access control. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop appropriate source access
control languages. How to define fine-grained access control policies under a proper provenance model is the main
concern of this paper.
Previous provenance DAG access control language has not employed different types of segments in provenance graphs
thoroughly. Although Danger et al. came up with the idea of returning origin subgraphs by answering access queries,
their approach relied on explicitly enumerated node sets and could not cope with scenarios with large Numbers of
nodes and unpredictable nodes. Therefore, a mechanism is proposed in this chapter to define a collection of nodes by
a summarizing approach. For example, a string of connected nodes can be defined in a policy by nominating a starting
node and an ending node. More concretely, a provenance logs an assignment written by a student and the operation
the student carries out upon the assignment. The provenance also records that the student submitted the assignment
to a professor and actions from the professor to grade it, attach comments, revisions, etc. However, students are not
allowed to gain any information about the operations carried out by the markers. However, it cannot be known in
advance, for a given submissions, how many operations will be involved in the marking. A professor may access the
submission multiple times and it may even be marked by more than one staff members. Therefore, a policy is required
that can block access to a portion of the provenance from the point of submission until the assignment is returned to
the student by the professor, regardless of how many processes have been done between those points.
In this paper, we propose a Segment-based Access Control Policy Language for Provenance (PACLP) by extending
existing policy languages. PACLP enables the specification of partial provenance graphs as well as transformation
scope, transformation mode, and transformation labels, in order to partition a provenance graphs in a fine-grained
approach and define how to transform the collected nodes into a new graph. And our major contributions can be
summarized as follows.
• The attributes are stored to each node in a provenance graph to support more fine-grained access control
policy, which can also be used in policies to specify which nodes are the targets of the policy.
• We use regular expressions , which based on Xpath query language, to define multiple ways to partition
provenance DAG, including single node, node type, path, and subgraph, which could be utilized as conditions
for access control policy.
2 Related Works
Several previous works have made significant contributions to provenance access control. Ni et.al [6] proposed an
initial fine-grained provenance access control language based on XACML syntax, which was customized according
to the provenance model of recording operational attributes. Subsequently, several papers proposed access control
languages of the DAG provenance models, and tried to partition provenance graphs and return partial graphs to users
[20] [11]. In addition, SPARQL query templates were presented to answer queries that record attributes in their
provenance.
Cadenhead et al. [18] extended an existing provenance access control language proposed by Ni et al. [6], which
introduced regular expression to protect traditional data items as well as their relationships from unauthorized users.
It was an XML-based structure policy language and associates grammar based on provenance graphs. In order to
evaluate the effectiveness of their policy language, a prototype language based on their architecture utilizing Semantic
Web technologies has been implemented.
Danger et al. [11] proposed a method that allows policies to define subgraphs that can be transformed through three
levels of abstractions, which presented an algorithm for transforming provenance graphs and generating accessible
versions of queries. Although Danger et.al presented the idea of returning provenance sub-graphs by answering
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access queries, their approach relies upon explicitly enumerated node-sets. This approach is not effective when the
policies contains a large amount of nodes. In addition, in some scenarios, the set nodes in a collection can not be
predicted in advance.
3 Provenance Access Control
3.1 The Basics of the policy language
Figure 1: The extended version of OPM: OPM+ Schema
Given the OPM+ <T, L, G>, an OPM+ instance is defined by a provenance graph Gi = < Vi, Ei >, where Vi is a set
of entities and Ei ∈ Vi × Vi ×L. τ : Vi → T is a function mapping an entity to its type, Gi is valid if for each entity v
∈ Vi, τ(v) ∈ T, and for each edge (v, v′, l) ∈ Ei, (τ (v), τ (v′), l)∈ E. We extend the definition of OPM in paper [20].
We will give some definitions here.
Definition 1 (Open Provenance Model+ (OPM+)) is an extension of OPM recording how is a piece of data derived,
which is defined by a triple <T, L, G>:
• T is the vertex types: agent (Ag), artifact (A), process (P) and attribute (Att). As shown in Fig 1, the artifact is
represented by the shape of oval, which is an object or a piece of data, such as “homework1”, “comments”;
A process is an operation performed on a piece of data, such as “submit” and “review”; An agent is a topic
that supports operations including “user1” and “professor”.
• L is the relationship labels: used (u), wasGeneratedBy (wgb), wasControlledBy (wcb), wasTriggeredBy
(wtb), wasDerivedFrom(wdf) and hasAttributes (ha). Each edge in a provenance graph will be marked as one
of these labels. Labels describe the relationships between vertices.
• G is a labelled DAG, where G = <V, E>, E defines the allowable relationships between the elements, E = {
(P, A, used), (A, P, wgb), (P, Ag, wcb), (A, A, wdf), (P, P, wtb), (Ag, Att, ha), (P, Att, ha), (A, Att, ha) }
Definition 2 (Provenance Path). A path p = { (vi, vi+1, ... vi+n) | n≥2}, starting from vi and ending at vi+n, which is
a collection of vertices that forms a line in a provenance DAG. In addition, if all the vertices in the path are connected
by cause edges , it is a directional provenance path indicating that all operations along the directional provenance path
occur in chronological order. The general provenance path may contain effect edges where processes recorded in a
general provenance path may not occur in chronological order.
(XPath Symbols). XPath is a query language defined by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) for selecting nodes
from an XML document. XPath can be used to compute values (e.g., strings, numbers, or Boolean values) from the
content of an XML document. Provenance paths are defined over XPath. A directional provenance path can be defined
as (vi//vj /vk), describing a provenance path that starts from vi and ends by vk, including vj between vi and vk.
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Table 1: Xpath Query Usage
Syntax Usage sample Description
//vi/vj/vk //o1v2/replace1/o1v1/upload1/au1 A Query path from o1v2 to au1 and goes through
nodes replace, o1v2, upload1 and au1.
//vi//vj/vk //o1v2//o1v1 Query all o1v1 nodes beneath o1v2 node
(only one path from o1v2 to o1v1)
//vi//vj[@Attri=Attri] //o2v2//review1[@Attri=Attri] Query the review1 node with
the Attri attribute beneath the o1v2 node
//vi//vj[@Attri=Attri]/vk //o2v2//review1[@Attri=Attri]/au2 Starting with o2v2, query an au2 node beneath
review1 with the attribute Attri
There are many ways to define the directional provenance path in Xpath can be summarized as follows: //vi/vj /vk,
which describes a provenance path from vi to vk and pass through a node vj ,and //vi//vj /vk ,which queries the node
vk in all vj nodes beneath vi , and //vi//vj[@Attri=Attri]/vk, which queries the node vk in all vj nodes with the Attri
attribute and beneath the node vj .Take the right picture in Figure 3 as an example, we use Xpath rules to traverse the
nodes shown in Tab.1
The keyword is used to distinguish direction and general paths.
au1
upload1 o1v1 replace1
o1v2submit1
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c 
au1
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ha 
ha 
uref ha 
ha 
c     wasControlledBy 
u     used 
g     wasGeneratedBy 
ha   hasAttributeOf 
gappend 
uinput 
uinput 
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upload1 o1v1 replace1
o1v2submit1
uinput gupload 
greplace 
uinput 
c 
au1
 C 
Attri review1
o2v1
revise1
o2v2
o1v3
grade1
o4v1
append1
o4v2
Attri
Attri
Attri
review2
o3v1
Attri
c 
au2
greview 
ha 
uinput 
greview 
c 
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g     wasGenerated By 
ha   hasAttribute Of 
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uinput 
uinput 
Figure 2: Sample Provenance Path A and B
• (TypedV ′P (Gi, upload)//TypedV ′P (Gi, submit))
The first example will match any provenance path that starts from a Process vertex named upload1 and ends
at a Process vertex named submit1. Since it is a directed path, all nodes in the path are connected by CE. In
Fig.2, the example expression matches the the provenance path described, which can also be represented as
follows:
→ (upload1, o1v1, replace1, o1v2, submit1): <upload1, o1v1, gupload>, <o1v1, replace1, uinput>,
<replace1, o1v2, greplace >, <o1v2, submit1, uinput >.
• (TypedV ′A(Gi, o2v1)//TypedV ′A(Gi, o4v1))
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The second example will match any provenance path that starts from a Artifact vertex named o2v1 and ends
at a Artifact vertex named o4v1. unlike directed path, edges at either end of the path can contain EE. In the
Fig.2, the example expression matches the illustrated the provenance path, which can also be represented as
follows:
→ (o2v1, review1(attri), o1v3, grade1, o4v1(attri)): <o2v1, review1, greview>, <review1, o1v3, uinput>,
<o1v3, grade1, uinput>, <grade1, o4v1, ggrade>.
• (TypedV ′Ag(Gi, au1), \v+, T ypedV ′A(Gi, o1v2))
The last example will match any provenance path that starts from an Agent vertex named au1 and ends at a
Artifact vertex named o1v2. In the given example graph, there are three coincident paths.
→ (au1, upload1, o1v1, replace1, o1v2): <au1, upload1, c>, <upload1, o1v1, gupload >, <o1v1, replace1,
uinput >, <replace1, o1v2, greplace >;
→ (au1, replace1, o1v2): <au1, replace1, c>, <replace1, o1v2, greplace >;
→ (au1, submit1, o1v2): <au1, submit1, c>, <submit1, o1v2, uinput >.
Definition 3 (Subgraph). Let G=<V, E>, S=<V′, E′ >. S is a subgraph of G, if V′ ⊆ V, E′ ⊆ E. A subgraph is a set
of vertices { (vj , vj+1, ... vj+n) | n≥2} in a provenance DAG. A partition P of G is a connected subgraph of G.
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Figure 3: Sample Subgraph A and B
We define subgraphs by specifying vertex expressions. A subgraph consisting of a given vertex is the target of a policy.
The policy defines a subgraph by nominating a starting node and an ending node of the subgraph as the subgraph (vi//
vj). A subgraph can start or end at endpoints of a provenance graph regardless of what those vertices are. Hence, in
PACLP language, a terminal of a provenance is expressed as / which is a starting point of a provenance DAG and .
which is an ending point of a provenance DAG. Specifically, subgraphs (vj /following::*) are graphs that start at the
beginning vertex of a provenance graph and end at the Vertex vj . Subgraph (vi/preceeding::*) is that starting at vi and
finishing at the end vertex of a provenance graph.
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Fig.3 highlights a subgraph (upload//submit1) starts with “upload 1” and ends with “submit 1”. Between the two
terminals, it summarizes all the nodes, including vertices of the type of Agent. The subgraph (o4v1/following::*) is
another example between vertex o4v1 and the end of the provenance DAG .
4 Partition-based Access Control Language on Provenance (PACLP)
A Partition-based Access Control Policy Language is proposed to extend the access control language [18], enabling
a policy to allow or prohibit access to partitions. First, language item PACLP tailored under the OPM+ stores the
attributes that support more fine-grained policies. Second, an XPath representation of the provenance partitions is
presented to determine which collection of nodes in the source DAG can be accessed. Therefore, the access to available
information could be maximized, rather than hiding the entire graph to protect partially unavailable attributes in a
provenance graph. Third, as provenance partitions could provide clues for data sensitivity and vulnerability, the
provenance partitions could be employed as conditions in policy.
Figure 4: System Model
As shown in Fig.4, the system model consisted of four parts: Administrator, Server, Users, and Database. Users send
queries to the Server to access provenance stored in a database. Administrator generates access control policies and
sends them to the Server. Server collects policies from administrators and (optional) data producers, and will generate
results based on the policies and delivers the results to the database when receiving queries. Database transforms the
target provenance graph based on the results to hide unavailable partitions and sends it to users. Details about the
model are discussed bellow.
4.1 Language Items
Our provenance access control policy PACLP is tailored over XACML syntax consisting of Target, Condition, Obli-
gation, Effect, and Transformation items. Each item contains one or more tags. To support more fine-grained control
policies, the PACLP constructed over the OPM+ attaches attributes sets to main entities. In addition, the provenance
partitions are employed as conditions to confine applicable policies to determine whether the partitions are accessible.
Transformation is an important item in policy, indicating how the provenance graphs should be transformed to hide
sensitive information. Transformation specifies how each provenance partition should be processed by replacement or
deletion. The transformation elements consist of four items, including provenance partitions, transformation scope,
transformation mode, and transformation label. First, we demonstrate how to define these provenance partitions in a
provenance access control policy and give some examples.
• Vertices. This will collect one or more types of vertices in a provenance DAG. These can be Agent, Process,
Artifact, or Attributes. Data owners may allow read operations but keep the executor anonymous. As shown
below, the agent vertices are collected with values of “wasGradedBy” or “Graded”.
vertices (TypedVAg(Gi))
vertices (Typed′P (Gi, wasGradedBy|Graded))
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PACLP
Target
Conditions
Subject Object
Access 
Purpose
Restriction
Obiligations
Effects
Transformation
Transformation 
Label 
Transformation 
Mode 
Transformation 
Scope 
Provenance 
Partiton 
Figure 5: PACLP Schema
• Provenance Path. This is a vertex line from DAG. Two types of source paths are defined based on the
directions of the edges : directed path and general path. In a directed path, only edges connect the vertices
from the origin to the destination; In general paths, there can exist effect edges between the two endpoints.
The following directed path example is from node “wasGradedBy” or “Graded” to node “wasSubmittedBy”
or “Submit”. Particularly, in a directed path the process from the original to the target is listed in chronological
order, as all nodes are linked by cause edges.
directed (TypedV ′Ag(Gi, wasGradedBy|Graded)//b+
TypedV ′Ag(Gi, wasSubmittedBy|Submit))
• Subgraph. A subgraph is a collection of vertices with a specified origin and/or destination, and can be repre-
sented as a subgraph (vi \v + vj). The first example of the subgraph below defines all operations performed
in the provenance graph Gi in 2016. Another example represents a partition from the vertex with a given
value to the end of the entire graph, representing all the operations that have occurred in the graph since 2016.
subgraphs (AttVP (Gi, 1/1/2016)//AttVP (Gi, 31/12/2016))
subgraphs (AttVP (Gi, 1/1/2016)/following :: ∗))
Transformation scope defines the scope of the node used for transformation, which accepts three possible values:
Original, Conjunction, and Extension. Original means that the vertices defined by access control policies do not extend
to other vertices in the given provenance graph. Conjunction indicates that a set of vertices should be integrated with
the connection nodes in the same category as VCD. To facilitate graph transformation, the VCD lists categories of
nodes and corresponding labels. When the graph is transformed, the label replaces the removed vertex. If the cluster’s
neighbor nodes belong to the same category, the cluster should expand to include those neighbor nodes. Extension is
a function that returns a set of clusters in a given provenance graph. For a given cluster of vertices, all vertices in the
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provenance graph belong to the same category and should be collected as a set of clusters, regardless of whether they
are connected to a given cluster.
Transformation mode indicates how to handle vertices that can be accessed or collected by provenance access control
policies. Two possible modes are “replace” and “remove”. For Replace mode, when transforming a new provenance
graph, replace the vertex cluster with the label pointing to the VCD. Labels are summary terms for vertex categories.
For Remove mode, it removes clusters of vertices specified by access control policy, and edges appear outside.
Transformation labels, for the Original dependency, when a cluster of nodes is removed or replaced, the original
dependency means that the two edges beside a removed node are merged by referencing to the Edge Merging Table
to maintain the original dependency. For the Fault dependency, it means removing the original label and replacing it
with ”wasCausedBy” to prevent the label showing clues to remove vertices.
The sample Transformation item defines two provenance partitions to be transformed. The first one is a subgraph
that starts at an Artifact vertex o3v1 and ends at Artifact vertex o8v1. As the transformation scope is “original”, the
subgraph does not contain any other vertices. Since the transform mode is ”replace”. It should be replaced with a label.
In addition, all the connection edges of the node cluster should be changed to ”wasCausedBy”. The second hidden
partition is a Process vertex Submit | was SubmittedBy. If adjacent nodes belong to the same category as defined by
the VCD, they are included in a partition, which is deleted according to the transformation mode. For edges, keep the
original edges, or merge them by referring to the Edge Merging Table.
<Transformation>
<partition>
subgraphs (TypedV ′A(Gi, o3v1)//TypedV
′
A(Gi, o8v1) >)
</partition>
<scope> original </scope>
<mode> replace </mode>
<label> false dependency </label>
<partition>
vertices (TypedV ′P (Gi, Submit|wasSubmittedBy))
</partition>
<scope> conjunction </scope>
<mode> remove </mode>
<label> original dependency </label>
</Transformation>
4.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the PACLP, the experiment is designed to simulate the policy generation, performed
onto a virtual machine with 16GB memory and 3.40 GHz CPU. The 20 sample provenance graphs and 200 policy
conditions and tags are generated. We select 300 random provenance partitions from the sample provenance graphs.
We count the numbers of provenance partitions under PACLP and LPAC. Obviously, in the storage entity attributes of
provenance model, compared with other other policy languages, PACLP can express more random sample provenance
partitions. From the figures, we can see PACLP is good at to describe more complicated provenance partitions with
more nodes. Then, we implement the process of merging the results of various policies. The three scenarios selected
are (1) all 20 sample policies are policies with the effect of Abosulte Permit (2) all 20 sample policies with the effect
of Deny, (3) 20 sample policies with all effects are randomly selected. We count the time span to simulate the process.
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Figure 6: left: Comparison of express ability of PACLP and LPAC. right: The time span of policy results combination
with different number of policies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a fine-grained provenance access control language PACLP under extended OPM storing
attribute sets to extend the exiting languages. Various types of provenance partitions are defined over XPath to de-
termine which nodes in the source DAG can be accessed. Our provenance access control language aims to define
which partial graph can be accessed or denied under conditions and restrictions. This fine-grained access control
policy model not only hides all sensitive vertices and edges in the provenance graph, but also maximizes accessible
qualifying information.
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